AN APPEAL BY MEMBERS OF THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL PARLIAMENT TO END THE SOMALI CRISIS AND SAVE SOMALIA FROM BECOMING A HAVEN FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: (ADOPTING A LOCALLY OWNED AND LED POLITICAL FRAMEWORK).HERE WE GO:
CONSEQUENT to the sumptuous lunch date and engagement the Somali Prime Minister, Omer Abdirashid Sharmarke, held at the Panari hotel in Nairobi on June 21, 2009 for about 100 Transitional Federal Government(TFG) MPs, as well as other government officials and supporters who are currently in Nairobi, there were numerous caucuses within, and exchange of views between the parliamentarians living in and out of the country.
The exchange of opinions centered on the difficult and trying situation facing the government of President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and the avenues still accessible of providing the necessary safeguards to protect it from sudden collapse, in the face of the on-going onslaught from the forces of Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam, as well as from the "Fifth Column´´ sycophants crawling around the President himself.
The following is a paradigm of these views.
1. The failure:
The overriding consensus of the parliamentarians concludes that the government is on the verge of failure, pending hitherto untapped local forces which might come to its rescue, and the causative factors for this failure are:
The three main premises on which the formation of the government were based have all proven to have been wittingly misleading ploys contrived to install a one-sided government from the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). These three fatal premises were:
i. The engineered removal of the then sitting President of the TFG Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed from office before the end of his tenure, and obstruction of the TFG from electing a replacement at its home base in Baidoa, but instead railroading the Parliament of Djibouti and holding hasty elections biased against everyone, except the candidate of the Djibouti-based Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia.
ii. The premature removal of the Ethiopian forces from Somalia, falsely assuming that this would put an end to armed hostilities against the TFG and AMISOM forces and give the government the political space to bring about national reconciliation and effective governance throughout the country.
iii. The supposition that the imposition of an Islamist president and the application of Sharia law are the panacea for thwarting Islamic militancy and Al-Qaida expansion in Somalia and the region at large.
The Djibouti conference in which the government was formed was a logical destination for the Nur-Adde tenure as Prime Minister to come to an abrupt end, in spite of the unmasked preference of some members of the international community to promote him to the presidency itself. In fact, it was the incumbency of Nur-Adde as the Prime Minister, which handed over the control of most of the regions of South-Central Somalia to the hands of the Islamist extremists and prepared the grounds for the current untenable situation in Somalia. The political, security and administrative gains which the TFG has made during the incumbency of Ali Mohamed Gedi as Prime Minister have all been reversed under the guise of promoting dialogue and reconciliation with the Islamists under Nur –Adde´s personal supervision.
Since the break of relations between the feuding wings of ARS and the Djibouti-Eritrean border conflict erupted, Djibouti was not any more an honest broker in the Somali Peace and Reconciliation Process. This reflected heavily in the selection of President Ahmed Sharif in Djibouti, and in the subsequent formation of the current weak government. The Djibouti conference turned out to be an externally directed exercise. None other than the Minister of Religious Endowment and the Minister of Information and National Guidance of the Republic of Djibouti, were calling the shots for most of the decisions reached during the conference and the formation of the Government.
Lack of experience among the members of the current government in administration, security and governance is unparalleled in magnitude since the formation of the TFG in 2004. In a clear reference to the external manipulations of the SRSG on the outcome of the Djibouti Conference and during its preparatory phases in which he acted like the supreme spiritual leader of Iran, Ali A1 Khomeini, the current Government is stigmatized by most of the Somalis as the Oulad Abdallah Government. Its performance so far has proven to be abysmally low in all fields of competence.
2. The Way out:
We (Members of the Transitional Federal parliament) would like to hasten to indicate at the foremost that a successful solution to the current Somali crisis can only be achieved through a collective approach involving all the various stakeholders and the traditional leadership, in a locally owned and led political framework. The relative peace, stability, democratic governance and humanitarian disaster in South- Central regions of the country including Mogadishu, the ravaged capital, can only be reversed through the application of this locally owned and led political framework approach which has already proven to work in a Somali setup successfully.
The question is: How?
The answer is: the adoption of the "Northern Option Strategy" to achieve in the short run the two primary objectives of (1) Strengthening good governance, security and economic levels of the already peaceful areas of the country such as Somali land and Puntland and (2) enabling the TFG to ward off the current onslaught of the combined evil forces of Al-Shabaab and Hisbul-Islam and safeguard the survival of the Transitional Federal Institutions and the basic tenets of the Transitional Federal Charter. In the long term, the objective of the Strategy is to safeguard the establishment of a democratic federal Somali State which is peaceful with itself, as well as with its neighbors.
In light of the current unpredictability of the security situation in Mogadishu, and in view of the fact that the parliament is the primary organ which sustains the very legality of the TFIs, it is the opinion of the absolute majority of the Parliamentarians that the Transitional Federal Parliament must be relocated to one of the peaceful cities in the North of the country. Naturally, the necessary preliminary legal and political arrangements have to be carried out with the competent authority in the region in which the Transitional Federal Parliament would be relocated.
The sustainability of the Somali State as a responsible, viable and contributive member state of the countries of the Greater Horn of Africa rests in maintaining the unity of its people and territory, and in the resolute commitment of these brotherly neighboring countries to help Somalia in the nurturing of this unity, in light of the damaging impacts the recent political ruptures, clan conflicts and social disarray have had on the territorial integrity and national stability of the country.
The proper understanding of the chronological interconnections and national magnitude of the most salient events which constitute the recent root-causes of the Somali conflict, is a necessary prerequisite for mapping out the strategy to bring the conflict to a successful resolution. One of the most common mistakes which undermine the proper understanding of the recent Somali conflict is the notion that the conflict begins with the collapse of the Central Government in late 1991 and the consequent breakup of the Somali State into warring clan fiefdoms. Bad governance is at the root of clan conflict, fratricidal warfare and political ruptures in the recent history of the Somali State, notwithstanding the fact that Somalia represents one of the most homogenous states in the African continent.
It was after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in late 1991 that the epicenter of the Somali conflict moved down to the South-Central regions of the country. The traumatic events which began to take place in those regions naturally captivated the involvement of the international community. It began with the United States initiated effort codenamed "Operation Restore Hope" (December 5, 1992 to May 4, 1993) that was charged with carrying out the United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the Southern and Central regions of Somalia. The resolution authorized the use of all necessary means militarily and politically to establish this environment. Ever since then, however, the establishment of peace and stability in this vital part of Somalia has proven to be too perennially elusive, to say the least.
In spite of the engagement of the International community to support the three Mogadishu-based transitional mechanisms, beginning with the Djibouti-based Transitional National Government headed by President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan (2000 – 2003), followed by the Kenya-based Transitional Federal Government under President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (2004 - 2008), and culminating in the current transitional order under President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the mayhem which started with the Hargeisa bombing in 1988 is continuing to date, and hundreds of thousands of Somali civilians are still being driven from their homes and subjected to inhumane conditions of living under trees in the outskirts of Mogadishu, their ravished capital, or forced to flee across the border with Kenya to seek refuge from the "unconscionable" war between the erstwhile companions of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia and their ill-gotten offspring Al-Shabaab, who are fighting over the spoils of governance under the pretext of enforcing Sharia law.
In the following few highlights, it would be prudent to underline three major factors which contributed to bad governance and the absence of peace and stability in South Central Regions, under the authority of the three above-mentioned transitional orders:
i. Soon after the fall of central authority in late 1991 and ever after, the domination of the interest of warlords, religious fraudsters and clan agendas over the national interest in the conduct of the affairs of the nation, perpetuated a culture of pursuing personal gains, cloaked under the banner of spurious claims to loot the spoils of national power and resources. Lack of accountability and transparency has become the shortcomings or hallmark of governance in consequent administrations in South-Central regions of the country.
ii. The spread of the predatory nature of pastoral clan politics began shaping governance with the deadly consequence of ethnic cleansing and grabbing of public and private property and farms from their rightful owners. On top of this, impunity and absence of justice and rule of law become the major characteristics which have impeded the creation of effective administration in these regions.
iii. The legacy of colonial rule which has systematically uprooted traditional Somali values during the colonial era and thus created a dangerous vacuum of traditional leadership at a time when social cohesion and reliance on national values are greatly required.
iv. The Northern Option Strategy is an attempt to bridge the gap between two contemporary experiences of the current Somali scene since the outbreak of the Civil War and the collapse of the Central Somali Government in 1991: The prevalence of relative peace, stability and social harmony in Somaliland and Puntland under a locally owned and led political framework, and the traumatic experience of lawlessness, instability and humanitarian disaster in South-Central regions of the country under an externally directed transitional political framework.
3 The Challenges Ahead:
The Transitional Federal Parliament is going through a period of critical importance while exercising its shaky mandate. Since the last Djibouti conference, the parliament has undergone a wholesale enlargement which casts a dark shadow over its authenticity and viability. Crucial Articles of the Transitional Federal Charter were sidestepped without amendments. The major pre-occupation of the conference was to make partisan accommodations for the political priorities of one of the two feuding wings of the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia, and some of its international patrons who were the linchpin (driving force) of the conference itself. Consequently, the parliament stands in shackles today under the mercy of those two warring factions of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia and their ill-gotten offspring Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of Al-Qaeda.
In its official communiqués, the government of President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and his Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke, is referred to as "Government of National Unity (GNU)" not as "Transitional Federal Government (TFG)". Actions of this sort border on treason for transgressing on crucial articles of the Transitional Federal Charter. By insisting on following such a course, the government is on the verge of falling over the Neo-Islamist ideological cliff which the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) fell over in 2006-2007. The basic tenets of the Transitional federal Charter must not be tampered with. This is a redline and a fundamental challenge for the success of the Government to get the support of the core members of the TFG who want to take a nationalist political stance to ward off the political and military attacks which Hisbul-Islam and Al-Shabab are mounting against the government. The national identity of the Somali nation is at stake due to the threat posed by these two organizations and their outside driven, Selfish-oriented and Al-Qaeda-oriented ideology.
It is about time that the Transitional Federal Parliament woke up to the immensity of the challenge faced by the Somali nation today. It must re-organize itself around a moderate and pragmatic political agenda and translate it into concerted political action with national content and vision. Currently, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is beset by the twin forces of internal dysfunction minimizing its effectiveness, and external coercion derailing any possible achievement of its national priorities. The immediate action of the new agenda must therefore mitigate these negative forces.
First, the new agenda should provide for a healthy dose of enlightened nationalism. It is this enlightened nationalism which best provides the necessary political antidote to alleviating the ills that have beset the Transitional Federal government. It must be accepted that these ills were mainly due to the anti-national, clan-centric political myopia which characterized the political dispositions and policy formulations of the Transitional Federal Government since it´s unfolding and/or inception, late 2004.
Second, the agenda should acknowledge that Somali nationalism is essentially based on the Islamic faith, Arab identity and African culture of the people of the Somali Republic who wish to live in peace, harmony, progress and cooperation with each other in their country, as well as with their brotherly and sisterly neighbors in the countries of the Horn of Africa, in full cognizance of the mutual acceptance of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and political independence of these countries.
Finally, the agenda should promote the creation of good governance and effective security at the central, regional and local levels of the country.
In essence, it is the actualization of good governance at these levels which provides the most efficient vehicle to nurture the required security forces to sustain durable peace throughout the country.
In the process of delivering governance to the people, however, it is important to note that clan-centric allegiance, in contrast to national allegiance, constitutes the biggest obstacle to the realization of good governance.
It is no wonder, therefore, that clan-centric allegiance of the TFG political leadership has been the most singular contributor to the failure of TFG governance and national security.
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