Markacadeey Editorial:
The prevailing mythology in Somalia with regard to tribal dynamics is: the appeasement of the “two most powerful clans” in Somalia is a sine qua non for the country’s political and economic stability. The so-called “two major clans” in Somalia have led us all to believe that they are a power to be reckoned with, and that their political and economic pre-eminence in the society is solid and well-entrenched.
The politicians and other stakeholders originating from the so-called “two most powerful clans” in Somalia claim to have played a major role in the struggle for Somalia’s independence, unlike, as they allege, Somalis from the “weak clans”. They also argue that they still enjoy a reputation for their probity, political integrity, and their effectiveness in the way they execute their national responsibilities – the reason why the leadership role in the country has almost always been entrusted to them.
They disagree on many issues. But on one thing they have so far been firm: the posts of the presidency and the premiership. These top political posts must always be conferred to them. They argue that the country has pursued this trend since independence and that any deviation from it may result in unintended consequences. They have literally owned the “presidency and the premiership” of Somalia. They would relinquish only the “presidency of the parliament” and deliver it someone from a clan they can manipulate, though this has lately openly turned against their selfishness and greed.
As the term of the current president is coming to an end, politicians, warlords, and some ambitious folks in the diaspora, genealogically classified as members of the so-called “two major clans”, have already expressed their intent to run for the presidency. Obviously, there are so far no front-runners from the other clans who are ready to take the incumbent on. It appears that the country will have to come to terms again, after August 2011, with a leadership that will represent the two hegemonic clans of Somalia.
Retrospectively, this hegemony had paradoxically enjoyed the support and the blessing of the other clans’ politicians – the politicians that are considered to be “powerless, weak and irrelevant” in the current Somali political context. They have paved the way for their rivals and helped them acquire a real foothold in Somali politics. With their unwavering help, the two hegemonic clans left everyone else out in the cold. Key ministerial portfolios that are strategically important have to be conferred to them. Because they are considered to be armed and aggressive, they must be mollified and enjoy more privileges than others
But history reminds us that nothing endures indefinitely. In fact, many Somalis now refuse to subscribe to the nonsensical and ludicrous political superiority portrayed by the two hegemonic clans. The clans that are perceived as being “irrelevant” are beginning to wake up. The defeatist mentality that has denied them the right to compete with the so-called “two most powerful clans” is rapidly waning. They resent and oppose their alleged pre-eminence, probity and political integrity. They argue that these hegemonic clans no longer have the monopoly on exerting decisive influence on Somali affairs.
Years of the anarchic rule of the politicians at the helm of Somalia’s leadership, beginning in 1960, have rendered the country more rigorously clannish in character, deeply polarized and hence more fragile and vulnerable. They have produced, among other evils: warlords, armed militias, and radical insurgents that are still engaged with impunity in the perpetuation of violence. Their hegemony has created a zero-sum Somalia: a situation that is based on the notion that there must always be one winner and one loser. The winners would be the “two big clans”, and the losers the “weak ones”.
The hegemonic leadership of the so-called “two most powerful clans’ politicians” and their supporters has given more impetus to the proliferation of rebels and radical groups – many from within their own sub-clans. The widespread poverty in their respective constituencies, coupled with the marginalization and alienation of the youth from their less privileged sub-clans have generated a sharp sense of division, frustration and despair among many. This leadership has undermined the legitimate grievances of their own youth and turned a blind eye on the challenges that were to be addressed in favour of their own political and economic interests.
These youth, ostracized and detested by their own political elite, have succumbed to an ideological twist and perversion as an expression of this social exclusion. The emergence of the Shabaab insurgency, at the height of Somalia’s political crisis, is partly due to the marginalization of the Somali youth, particularly those belonging to the clans and sub-clans that are considered as “pariahs.” The irrational behaviour of the Shabaab and their indiscriminate killing of innocent Somalis must be condemned. But it is also important to try and gain a more nuanced and informed understanding of the rationale behind their suicidal attitudes.
Markacadeey submits that it is high time that Somalis dismantle; once and for all, the clan hegemony that has crippled and weakened Somalia’s recovery efforts. Time has laid bare the powerlessness of those hegemonic clans that have led everyone in the world to believe that they a since qua non for the country’s stability and peace. Markacadeey argues for a radical rethink on the discriminatory 4.5 formula, which was created in order to appease the warlords spawned by the so-called “two major clans.”
The next president of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia will be elected by the Transitional Federal Parliament before August 2011. The candidates from the so-called “two most powerful clans” might have already declared that they are well on their way to replacing the incumbent president. But that is going to be far-fetched. Markacadeey predicts that candidates from the other clans will soon emerge as front-runners. They will run and win to replace the incumbent president.
For those who believe that this is going to be a daunting task, Markacadeey’s response is: maybe; but there are many shrewd politicians out there from the other clans who have the charisma and unrivalled ability to attract voters from the different clans in the parliament and defeat the incumbent. In order to bring about change in Somalia, the mindsets and attitudes of the clan fanatics from the so-called “two major clans” must change. They have to cave in to the reality and accept the fact that no clan can supersede others in the society. Somalia’s political landscape must remain diverse, deeply pluralistic, and resistant to any clan hegemony.
“The new Somali Constitution must guarantee that no clan in Somalia supersedes the others. It must also ensure that Somalia’s political landscape remains diverse, deeply pluralistic, and resistant to any clan hegemony”.
The prevailing mythology in Somalia with regard to tribal dynamics is: the appeasement of the “two most powerful clans” in Somalia is a sine qua non for the country’s political and economic stability. The so-called “two major clans” in Somalia have led us all to believe that they are a power to be reckoned with, and that their political and economic pre-eminence in the society is solid and well-entrenched.
The politicians and other stakeholders originating from the so-called “two most powerful clans” in Somalia claim to have played a major role in the struggle for Somalia’s independence, unlike, as they allege, Somalis from the “weak clans”. They also argue that they still enjoy a reputation for their probity, political integrity, and their effectiveness in the way they execute their national responsibilities – the reason why the leadership role in the country has almost always been entrusted to them.
They disagree on many issues. But on one thing they have so far been firm: the posts of the presidency and the premiership. These top political posts must always be conferred to them. They argue that the country has pursued this trend since independence and that any deviation from it may result in unintended consequences. They have literally owned the “presidency and the premiership” of Somalia. They would relinquish only the “presidency of the parliament” and deliver it someone from a clan they can manipulate, though this has lately openly turned against their selfishness and greed.
As the term of the current president is coming to an end, politicians, warlords, and some ambitious folks in the diaspora, genealogically classified as members of the so-called “two major clans”, have already expressed their intent to run for the presidency. Obviously, there are so far no front-runners from the other clans who are ready to take the incumbent on. It appears that the country will have to come to terms again, after August 2011, with a leadership that will represent the two hegemonic clans of Somalia.
Retrospectively, this hegemony had paradoxically enjoyed the support and the blessing of the other clans’ politicians – the politicians that are considered to be “powerless, weak and irrelevant” in the current Somali political context. They have paved the way for their rivals and helped them acquire a real foothold in Somali politics. With their unwavering help, the two hegemonic clans left everyone else out in the cold. Key ministerial portfolios that are strategically important have to be conferred to them. Because they are considered to be armed and aggressive, they must be mollified and enjoy more privileges than others
But history reminds us that nothing endures indefinitely. In fact, many Somalis now refuse to subscribe to the nonsensical and ludicrous political superiority portrayed by the two hegemonic clans. The clans that are perceived as being “irrelevant” are beginning to wake up. The defeatist mentality that has denied them the right to compete with the so-called “two most powerful clans” is rapidly waning. They resent and oppose their alleged pre-eminence, probity and political integrity. They argue that these hegemonic clans no longer have the monopoly on exerting decisive influence on Somali affairs.
Years of the anarchic rule of the politicians at the helm of Somalia’s leadership, beginning in 1960, have rendered the country more rigorously clannish in character, deeply polarized and hence more fragile and vulnerable. They have produced, among other evils: warlords, armed militias, and radical insurgents that are still engaged with impunity in the perpetuation of violence. Their hegemony has created a zero-sum Somalia: a situation that is based on the notion that there must always be one winner and one loser. The winners would be the “two big clans”, and the losers the “weak ones”.
The hegemonic leadership of the so-called “two most powerful clans’ politicians” and their supporters has given more impetus to the proliferation of rebels and radical groups – many from within their own sub-clans. The widespread poverty in their respective constituencies, coupled with the marginalization and alienation of the youth from their less privileged sub-clans have generated a sharp sense of division, frustration and despair among many. This leadership has undermined the legitimate grievances of their own youth and turned a blind eye on the challenges that were to be addressed in favour of their own political and economic interests.
These youth, ostracized and detested by their own political elite, have succumbed to an ideological twist and perversion as an expression of this social exclusion. The emergence of the Shabaab insurgency, at the height of Somalia’s political crisis, is partly due to the marginalization of the Somali youth, particularly those belonging to the clans and sub-clans that are considered as “pariahs.” The irrational behaviour of the Shabaab and their indiscriminate killing of innocent Somalis must be condemned. But it is also important to try and gain a more nuanced and informed understanding of the rationale behind their suicidal attitudes.
Markacadeey submits that it is high time that Somalis dismantle; once and for all, the clan hegemony that has crippled and weakened Somalia’s recovery efforts. Time has laid bare the powerlessness of those hegemonic clans that have led everyone in the world to believe that they a since qua non for the country’s stability and peace. Markacadeey argues for a radical rethink on the discriminatory 4.5 formula, which was created in order to appease the warlords spawned by the so-called “two major clans.”
The next president of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia will be elected by the Transitional Federal Parliament before August 2011. The candidates from the so-called “two most powerful clans” might have already declared that they are well on their way to replacing the incumbent president. But that is going to be far-fetched. Markacadeey predicts that candidates from the other clans will soon emerge as front-runners. They will run and win to replace the incumbent president.
For those who believe that this is going to be a daunting task, Markacadeey’s response is: maybe; but there are many shrewd politicians out there from the other clans who have the charisma and unrivalled ability to attract voters from the different clans in the parliament and defeat the incumbent. In order to bring about change in Somalia, the mindsets and attitudes of the clan fanatics from the so-called “two major clans” must change. They have to cave in to the reality and accept the fact that no clan can supersede others in the society. Somalia’s political landscape must remain diverse, deeply pluralistic, and resistant to any clan hegemony.
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