As US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton arrives in Nairobi where she is attending a trade conference as part of her African tour and is expected to meet with Somali President Ahmed Sheriff, Australian authorities are said to have successfully foiled a terrorist attack planned by a group allegedly involved with the Al-Shabaab in Melbourne.
The Somali conflict is attracting a lot of volunteer fighters across the world. Somalia symbolises the fight between Islam and the West on African territory much in the mould of Afghanistan for these radicals.
Those who wish to contain this “ terrorist infestation” want more support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and include the United States and several European countries.
Support for the TFG is consolidating as seen from Ms Clinton’s proposed meeting with Sheriff and the decision by the Obama administration to ship tens of tonnes of military equipment, some of which Al-Shabaab militants have reportedly captured, to the Sheriff government.
Ironically, by drawing the battle lines so clearly, the US and its regional allies are making Somalia a more attractive destination for radical Islamists.
But the TFG, even with US-allied military support, will find it difficult if not impossible to establish control over the whole of Somalia even if it survives the present military onslaught on it by the Al-Shabaab.
A new strategy to turn things around in Somalia is necessary but action against the Al-Shabaab must not be understood to mean blind, unreserved support for the feeble regime of President Sheriff. One must ask if the TFG is the best option to contain the spread of radicalism in Somalia and beyond. What would be the actual cost of maintaining its thin legitimacy even if it were to win battles today with the help of an offensive African Union force or some other “surge strategy” by its international supporters?
Thus far support for the TFG has been counterproductive and accelerated radicalism within Somalia inspiring terrorists abroad.
What if the allies exited TFG and allowed the Al-Shabaab which is the military authority in most of Somalia to consolidate control? Will a Somalia without the TFG cease to be viable as a strategy against the spread of terrorism? The best hope of containing the Al-Shabaab in Somalia is to deinternationalise the conflict there by leaving it to Somalis.
Removing the TFG from Somalia can lead to some positive scenarios.
First, it will take away the fundamentalist premise for the fighting. Mr Sheriff himself who pioneered the Al Shabaab movement probably knows that it cannot survive the resurgence of clan identities which would re-emerge as soon as the TFG, a symbol of Western meddling, is no longer the enemy.
This is not a bad thing. A Somali political consensus cannot be arrived at under the present matrix where the military contest is based on religious war which obscures the political contest underneath.
Secondly, a new administration cannot further a religious agenda across Somalia’s borders. If an Al-Shabaab administration attempted to extend its fight into Ethiopia, it would surely face an invasion which would only complicate its dispensation. It would also have to re-evaluate its relationship with Eritrea and Kenya (which has a large Somali population).
Thirdly but not least, only if there is a military power with some legitimacy even one drawn from the exit of the TFG, regional bodies like the East African Community, Igad or even the African Union can constructively involve themselves in peacebuilding.
The heirs of the TFG can be tasked to explain what kind of government they intend to run and the region must be willing to put together firmly, and with the threat of military force, against any unacceptable agenda’s especially the radical versions of rule that disregard basic human rights.
An invasion in the future by East African countries against a ‘rogue’ state in Somalia as far-fetched as it sounds, is still a better proposition than the open-ended support of the TFG.
Source: Monitor.co.ug
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