Sunday, December 12, 2010

Somalia: SENDING MORE FOREIGN PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO SOMALIA? (Open Letter to UN & USA)

By Prof. Mohamoud Iman Adan- Virginia, USA -

Prelude: Again such policy is unpractical and counterproductive. Since early1992, the World has witnessed similar policies advocated and sponsored by UN Security Council, which never got off the ground due to the culture and character of the Somali people. In the other hand, foreign soldiers stationed in hostile ground, like the southern Somalia, are not performing peace keeping duties alone.

Their other priorities include making big backs and protecting themselves and the military gear under their custody without a second thought. The order is shoot at real or presumed enemy before a comrade is harmed. After all, soldiers are trained to over power or kill opponents. So the epic name of peace keeping doesn't hold water an does not make any sense to the victimized civilian population. Rather, it is a commercialized political jargon to mislead the people, just to solicit financial contributions for Somalia in the name of peace and development. And the southern regions of Somalia won't buy it.

By tradition, foreign army stationed in the country is seen a national threat- a concept embedded in the social values of the people for centuries. The UN, the East African countries, as well as many Western Nations do not take this fact into account and avoid to consult with the tradition of the recipient nation of how they would like to be helped. Instead, they are shoved foreign forged policies into their throats, which in most cases, is unpalatable to the taste of the masses.

Regardless of the will of the conflicted regions, EGAD and UN are fond of implementing such ineptitude policies and deploying foreign armed forces in the southern regions of Somalia, a failed one after another. In doing so, UN has to get prepared to change an old age social perception that resists intervention of foreign army in their country without their consent.

God knows how long do such policies could work for the UN; but the local people believe that resisting masses will outlast than any foreign policy imposed on them. Such unity of purpose has supporting historical background element, and, perhaps, not taken note by the UN Security Council. A few example suffice for reckoning the mental frame of the local people under foreign military threat:

I. Somali nomads fought a campaign of tug of war with Ethiopian hermit kingdoms. The long lasting conflict was about land expansion and pasture rights. Ethiopian farmers retaliated by severing the main tendons of camels' hind legs-the pride and lifeline treasure of the pastoral Somali society, just to intimidate the nomads.

The conflicting parties had a different mental frame. The Somali pastorals believed that pasture and water are the grace of God and no one should claim exclusive ownership over them. But the Ethiopian farmers believed in land ownership and opted out to fight such concept; but finally gave up to taking part of the conflict for so long and settled valley farmlands among higher plateaus, where livestock could hardly get by. The conflict ended after the death of Ahmed Gurey, “The left handed pastoral leader,” who led the resistance. Local historians have it that the conflict era coincided with the timing of Christoforo Colombo trip on his way to find a short cut way to the land of spaces in 1492. The pastorals had a purpose of unity and resisted retaliatory actions of their foes.

II. In early 19th Century, Italian military contingents made incursions on the Eastern coast of Somalia only to meet a fierce resistance by Biyamal warriors that lasted 21 years of bloody skirmishes. The local uprising held up off shore the invasive enemy for so long and did not capitulate to the on-slaughtering cannon fire. At the end, the military stubbornness gave way to subtle diplomacy and the Italian admiralty negotiated with a policy of peaceful terms of non-interference and respectable co-existence with the local community.

The contingents were finally allowed to land on shore safe and trustworthy. It was the first military contingents settled at Shalambot, 60 miles south of Mogadishu who became the front-runners of the Italian colonization task force in the Southern Somalia. Take note of the war chronology historic book titled “ferro e' Fuoco” in East Africa. This is an example of how the Somalis had always reserved contempt about foreign intrusion into the country.

III. On the opposite side of Northwest coast of Somalia, the British army was bogged down by the Dervishes- the horse-bone pastoral warriors- led by Mohamed Abdulle Hassan- a charismatic local leader who resisted the invasion of foreign army into the country. The British Foreign Office wanted meat supplies for its garrison stationed in Aden, south Yemen and fought the Darvishes to the end by establishing a military base at Berbera, a seaport at the Red Sea that faces South Yemen.

It was not an easy walkover as jotted by the British foreign policy-makers; but turned to become a long war, which had all the ingredients of pastoral warrior psyche and the military mighty of British Empire that lasted for 21 bloody years. At the end, the Dervishes got defeated by the bombardment of RAF, the British Royal Air Force in early 20th century fought at foreign soil. RAF destroyed the strongholds of Dervishes at Taleeh and elsewhere, located some 90 miles Northeast of Berbera; yet no British foot soldier dared to follow the Dervishes and finish off the retreating warriors for good. The British aviation technology won the war by using its air force superiority, which was the last resort for the British army to win a challenging war.

Those survived dervishes argued that the bombardment was not one to one man war in the open. Details of the wars are available at British Military museum in London that could have served a lesson for the UN Security Council to consult before sending armed contingents into the country. The net shell of the war engagement revolved on two clashing factors: The pride of egalitarian pastorals against the indomitable ego of British army. The Dervishes had this mindset: Who budges first? Who owns the land in contention? Who has the final say? Was the outcome of the war worthy of loss of lives, property and human resources?

IV. In 1964, the Somali nascent army had border dispute with the impressive Ethiopian army. It took a month to push the Ethiopian forces back to their bases in Ethiopian heartland and dusted off their hands. The pastoral army came back home war hardened and victorious. Again the local forces showed that no foreign army can invade the country without impunity.

V. In 1977-78, Somalia had land dispute war with Ethiopia. It was a hard fought war and costly one for both sides. In three months, the pastoral army routed the Ethiopian military regiments nicknamed “The Lion of African,” and planted the national flag some 90 miles East of Addis Abeba, the Capital City of Ethiopia. In good time, whoever, the military alliance of Ethiopia, Russia, Cuba and South Yemen helped out the besieged country and restored the land it had lost, while pushing the Somali army back over the border line. The war ended but, it increased the enmity of the two nations- a lingering hard feeling Ethiopia reserves for Somalia until now.

VI. The Role of UN in Somalia
UN involvement in Somalia has nothing to do with humanitarian endeavors. Rather, it unmitigated business. As elsewhere in some other parts of the world, conflicted 3rd world nations create steady jobs for UN involvement into the internal affairs of their countries. If conflict trend drops down, there are always subtle ways to strike new grounds and keeping the momentum; because a world without armed conflicts is a sure way of ending UN profile in the world. So the survival of UN Regional Offices in Nairobi, Kenya feed and prosper on human tragedy and relish to stay on course; but they are not alone. There are hundreds of Somali political goons who destabilize peace and security of the southern regions and connect well with UN Regional Officials. They are accepted as the best buddies of UN Regional services as they are instrumental of keeping Somalia in turmoil, while keeping UNDP in business.

This is a fact:.... (READ FULL ARTICLE HERE)

Source: keydmedia.net

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