LAST year, pirates took 1,181 people hostage off the Somali coast. About half were released after the payment of ransoms, a few have died of abuse or neglect and around 760 are currently in captivity. They are usually held prisoner on their own hijacked vessels, some of which are employed as mother-ships from which the pirates stage further raids. So far this year, there have been 35 attacks, seven of them successful. In March, when the monsoon abates and the Arabian Sea grows calmer, the pace of the attacks will quicken.
The problem has worsened sharply in recent years. There were 219 attacks last year compared with 35 in 2005. Ransoms paid last year climbed to $238m, an average of $5.4m per ship, compared with $150,000 in 2005. At the end of last month Jack Lang, a former French minister who advises the UN on piracy, warned the Security Council that Somali pirates were becoming the “masters” of the Indian Ocean. He puts the economic cost of piracy at $5 billion-7 billion a year (see article). The price in human misery is unquantifiable.
However, eradicating Somali piracy is as hard as it is desirable. Because Somalia is not a functioning state, the pirates can operate freely from their harbours in the north, mostly in the breakaway territory of Puntland. Although ships from over 25 countries patrol the area and maritime law equips naval vessels off the Horn of Africa with powers of arrest, bringing pirates to justice is frustrated by cost, restrictive rules of engagement and politics. Hence 90% of captured pirates are released quickly and without sanction. And the foreign patrols’ effectiveness is declining as the pirates move ever farther offshore.
There are many suggested remedies, some bad. Outlawing ransoms is neither feasible nor in the hostages’ interests. Stationing armed guards on vessels or training crews to use firearms would only provoke a more brutal response from the pirates. Applying the historic cure for piracy—exemplary violence—would lead to many more dead hostages.
The successful campaign against the pirates who caused mayhem in the Malacca Strait a decade ago suggests that the answer lies onshore rather than offshore. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore agreed to bury their differences and work together—patrolling, arresting, prosecuting and imprisoning pirates. At the same time as the risks for the pirates increased, conditions on shore improved. The post-tsunami peace settlement between the Indonesian government and rebels in Aceh, where most of the pirates came from, paved the way for investment, economic development and a better way of life.
A black spot
A similar twin-track policy for Somali piracy would mean first putting money and effort into training coastguards, and constructing courts and prisons in the region. The authorities should also go after the dozen known kingpins who back the pirate gangs. At the same time, because it will take decades to rebuild the shattered Somali state, the outside world must itself engage directly with Puntland’s clans and help rebuild villages, infrastructure and fisheries which have been ravaged by foreign trawlers and the dumping of toxic waste. Although the region is chaotic, its prospects are not hopeless: neighbouring Somaliland, a breakaway piece of Somalia unrecognised by the rest of the world, makes a fair fist of governing itself.
The European Union, which operates one of the biggest anti-piracy naval forces in the area, says it is committed to a “comprehensive approach” that combines bringing pirates to justice and helping them find other livelihoods. It is a chance for Lady Ashton, the EU’s foreign and security chief, to show that her new external action service merits the name.
Source: The economist
No comments:
Post a Comment