Located on the southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen has long been regarded as a buffer zone between oil-rich Saudi Arabia and war-torn Somalia, which lies just 320 kilometers across the piracy-prone waters of the Gulf of Aden. Plummeting oil production and rising political tensions are now provoking questions about Yemen’s ability to maintain security and stability with ever fewer resources.
The director general of Britain’s security service, Jonathan Evans, last month warned that terrorist plots targeting Britain had been uncovered in Somalia and Yemen. Both countries face similar challenges: weak governments grappling with localized insurgencies, resurgent terrorist groups and severe economic difficulties. Western powers are struggling to find effective strategies for engagement amid doubts about the capability — or willingness — of local authorities to stabilize the country against the threat of violent extremists.
Yemen and Somalia, with their “ungoverned spaces,” trained militants and plentiful weapons, are viewed with anxiety as potential safe havens for terrorists. These anxieties are sharpened by news that Al Qaeda affiliates in both countries are recruiting and training Western citizens. The increasing appeal of these fragile states to disaffected Western-born Muslims and converts is raising concerns about the increasing risk of terrorist activity emerging from the two countries.
Heightened interest among security analysts in the connections between Yemen and Somalia has focused attention on strong semi-criminal businesses operating in the Gulf of Aden. These “shadow networks” facilitate a flourishing but highly unregulated regional trade shifting arms, people and fuel between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.
A recent paper from independent think tank Chatham House argues that these multimillion dollar business operations obstruct conventional counterterrorism strategies, such as close management of the movement of people and money across borders.
After two decades of civil war in Somalia, brokers throughout the region have established mature smuggling networks whose main purpose is not to support cooperation among like-minded terror groups but simply to make money.
For the time being, the risk of terrorist networks on both sides of the Gulf of Aden joining forces appear limited, and there is currently little evidence of joint command and control. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and insurgent group Al Shabab in Somalia have little in common beyond a broadly conceived notion of violent global jihad, and each has its own character and its own narratives around injustice, largely rooted in national politics. These issues are not being addressed by existing Western interventions.
In the fragile states of Yemen and Somalia, international intervention can take place on the basis of a state-building framework. In theory, this model should help to address local grievances by enhancing the capacity of these two governments to govern and to govern well.
In practice, Western preoccupation with its own counterterrorism objectives means that priority is often given to security assistance rather than state-building.
While the Obama administration has ruled out sending regular troops to either country, Washington is arming, training and funding local proxies to track and kill suspected terrorists in Yemen. In Somalia, US emphasis has been on support for the African Union peacekeeping mission AMISOM to protect the transitional government and help it to develop the capability of monitoring its own security.
Herein lies the risk of aggravation. Stabilization of states such as Yemen and Somalia cannot be achieved by security interventions alone. On the contrary, international interventions in security can serve to undermine the legitimacy of fragile regimes, and weaken the position of the West’s local allies. Misjudged security operations, as Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia so dramatically illustrated, can fuel discontent and serve as a powerful driver of radicalization and militant aggression.
Certainly, intervention policy options for reducing the terrorist threat are much more bleak in Somalia than in Yemen. But the lessons of unsuccessful engagement in Somalia should be applied across the water: a narrow focus on buttressing central government institutions will not succeed.
Ginny Hill is an associate fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Program and Sally Healy is an associate fellow in the Africa Program at Chatham House. This comment is based on their recent paper “Yemen and Somalia: Terrorism, Shadow Networks and the Limitations of State-Building.”
Ginny Hill is an associate fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Program and Sally Healy is an associate fellow in the Africa Program at Chatham House. This comment is based on their recent paper “Yemen and Somalia: Terrorism, Shadow Networks and the Limitations of State-Building.”
Source:-The Jakarta Globe.
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