United Nations, Conference Room 3, Nairobi
January 10, 2012
UK Introduction:
UK reintroduced the objectives of this conference: to galvanize international engagement, to inject fervor, to take stock on current progress. UK affirmed several times that this was not a conference that was intended to disrupt Roadmap efforts or to establish a parallel process.
Non Paper on the Political Track:
All parties acknowledged that this paper was written before the Garowe Principles were signed by the Somali stakeholders and as a result, many of its suggestions were moot. TFG OPM said that the London Conference should support the Somali decisions in the Garowe Principles. TFG also emphasized that Somalia was finished with transitions and interim political arrangements, and August 2012 was going to be the start of permanent government.
While all international community representative supported the Garowe Principles and affirmed that they did not want to see any new constructs, they did call for the following things:
By February, they would need to see visible signs of progress such as steps towards completion of the constitution, mechanisms in place for selection of the NCA and the new parliament. (USA)
Operationalization of the Garowe Principles and greater concensus around it. For example, broader participation in the Garowe Principles, i.e., support from elders, civil society, youth, etc. (Sweden)
Clarity around how we were going to avoid having the current political issue of the two speakers taint or pollute the London Conference? (France)
Deputy SRSG outlined his hopes for the London Conference to be a stock-taking exercise and a discussion on the resources required. He outlined these five areas:
1.Security consolidation
2.Governance, in terms of accountability but also in terms of administrative capability in managing the newly recovered areas.
3.Implementation of the new constitution
4.Elections – not just at the end of the next 4 year period, but consistently during these four years at the district/regional level. This will allow Somalis to build up their know-how, develop census, etc. (Last Somali election was in 1960)
5.International community’s involvement – the future of AMISOM, engagement of the UN, the Trust Fund arrangement, etc.
TFG OPM affirmed the territorial integrity of Somalia and raised the question of Somaliland and the UK’s intentions on this topic at the London Conference. UK affirmed their support for the territorial integrity of Somalia, reassured the group that the UK has not recognized Somaliland’s independence, but they did think that Somaliland had a lot to contribute towards Somalia’s future. They did confirm that Somaliland has been invited to attend the conference.
TFG Office of the President also expressed concern about the discrepancy between the UK non-paper’s interim period and the Garowe Principles. Simultaneously, they presented a position paper that includes recommendations on Reconciliation (e.g., facilitating a Somali-led effort, bringing Somaliland to the table), Security (e.g., rebuilding Somali forces, lifting UN arms embargo) and Financial Management (e.g., creating an independent Joint Financial Management Board). A copy is attached.
Non-Paper on Supporting Military Efforts in Somalia:
TFG OPM asked the group to support the NSSP, into which both the TFG and the international community had already poured a great deal of effort and resource.
TFG Ambassador to Kenya affirmed that Somalia condemns the pirates and asked the international community to condemn illegal fishing in Somali waters. A small discussion on the topic of the EEZ commenced, with the TFG OPM reemphasizing that the Cabinet of Ministers and the Somali Parliament have removed this topic from the Roadmap. It was agreed to take this topic offline.
AU gave a small update on the recent AU Peace and Security Committee meeting, affirming that they are working on defining the new resources and force enablers needed.
USA called for more donors to engage in supporting AMISOM and the TFG Forces as the resources base was too narrow.
Non-Paper on Financial and Asset Management in Somalia:
The discussion centered around the need to come up with clear TOR for the Joint Management Financial Board prior to the February Conference, answering difficult questions such as the relationship between this body and the new Parliament (i.e., whether this body’s decisions would have to be ratified by Parliament?)
Non-Paper on Promoting Local Stability in Somalia:
In introducing this topic, the UK emphasized the importance of supporting local development and stability, while avoiding balkanization and fragmentation. They emphasized the importance of the principle of “do no harm” when injecting cash into local environments.
TFG OPM emphasized that given the political nature of these efforts, the TFG would be the ideal party to coordinate these efforts. The TFG has developed a principles guiding the TFG are:
(1) Promoting social reconciliation and setting up political administrations
(2) Restoring law and order and justice
(3) Containment of heavy weapons, followed by comprehensive DDR
(4) Restoring humanitarian relief distribution; and repatriation of IDPs and refugees
(5) Providing basic services
TFG OPM also emphasized the importance of international community efforts in local areas not undermining the credibility of the TFG.
Deputy SRSG suggested that one of the principles to guide international community engagement with local areas or unit should be that (1) there should be a commitment to the Roadmap process by such unit, and (2) the units should be civilian and not military administrations.
TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA’S POSITION PAPER ON THE LOND ON CONFERENCE: EMERGING THOUGHTS
I. BACKGROUND:
The United Kingdom government has recently announced a conference on the Situation in Somalia to be held on February 23, 2012 in London. Subsequently, certain statements were made by British officials to pave the way for the said conference. The British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, said: “Somalia poses significant threats to international security, as a base for terrorists and pirates who threaten the security and prosperity of people around the world.” Furthermore, British Prime Minister, David Cameron, issued a statement calling Somalia a “failed state that directly threatens British interests.”
It is imperative to underline three particular facts. First, threats that have been emanating from Somalia are currently in declining trend. Second, these threats are symptoms, not the core problems. Third, political instability and underdeveloped and mal-equipped security apparatus are the real problems.
The aforementioned statements stand in sharp contrast to the current situation in Somalia and do not seem to take into considerations recent development that occurred in the latter half of 2011. Despite the enormous and agonizing difficulties encountered mainly on the security front, Somalia has certainly been bouncing back from the dark security challenges of the past two decades, thanks to the extraordinary determination and perseverance of the Somali TFG and AMISOM forces.
Though sporadic armed clashes still occur, the TFG and AMISOM forces have defeated Al-shabaab and cleared them from the capital city. As a result, today the ordinary residents of Mogadishu are able to get around and resume their normal lives in safety and security once again. Moreover, recent visits by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in August 2011 and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in December 2011, demonstrate Mogadishu’s strides in security.
The Al-shabaab’s forces are now on the run and its reign of terror is precipitously withdrawing from many cities and districts under the coordinated joint military pressure. The process of eradicating Al-Shabaab is already underway, and the total liberation of the country from the clutches of Al-shabaab terrorism is soon to be a reality.
For the past year and half, the TFG faced the worst famine in Somalia in sixty years and with backing of the international community and our Turkish friends, we have made some progress in reaching those affected by the famine. This famine created new challenges and many TFG resources were diverted to tackling its consequences and ensuring effective delivery of aid.
Additionally, on the security front, Somalia has developed a comprehensive medium term National Security Stabilization Plan (NSSP) that outlines clearly benchmarks and responsibility for its implementation. The NSSP, which has been already passed by the TFG cabinet aims at stabilizing the country in the next three years 2011-2014.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LONDON CONFERENCE:
In our view, the recently announced February 23, 2012 UK government conference on the Situation in Somalia should build on recent TFG accomplishments and support a more lasting solution for Somalia. The agenda should not be limited to the issues of piracy and international security. Rather, it should include addressing the root causes of those security concerns. For the London Conference to be successful we are putting forth the following recommendations:
1- Reconciliation:
We believe that a military victory leading to a durable peace is unlikely. Therefore, we seek a comprehensive peace process that includes all stakeholders at all levels and has international guarantees.
1.Primary focus should be on facilitating a Somali-led national all inclusive reconciliation effort.
1.The British government should use its diplomatic and political weight in bringing Somaliland to the table; not as an observer, but as a partner in peace.
1.Strategize ways to address the range of driving factors fueling the conflict in Somalia and help prevent recurring conflict.
2- Security: Highlight the importance of national security mechanisms to enhance the legitimacy of the national government.
1.The only lasting solution to the complex security problem is to rebuild a credible Somali national army, police, and intelligence security force capable of guaranteeing Somalia’s internal security and territorial water.
1.Lift the current UN arms embargo resolution to allow the Somali armed force import the required weaponry, mobility and military supplies that would enable their combat readiness to totally disrupt and defeat Al-shabaab and carry out their defensive mandate.
1.Build a viable Somali navy and strengthen the Somali national coast guard with efficient operational capacity, training; armed and equipped with adequate weaponry, technology and supplies (i.e. adequate patrol boats, ships, radar and radios) that would allow them to protect our coastal and maritime security, including piracy, toxic waste dumping, illegal fishing, and armed robbery in the Somali coast.
1.Finalize the enlistment and training of the 30,000 troops; guarantee their continuous and incessant stipend payment and the refurbishing of troops’ barracks, headquarters and training facilities, so that the command and control of the army units is secured, troops are provided with adequate quarters; the routine trainings programs are regularly and frequently carried out. All this will come to the same cost as 12,000 AMISOM troops.
1.Re-institute and revitalize the law enforcement agencies and their facilities, including the police stations in all urban centers, the custodial corps and court system. This to guarantee the competent fulfillment of law enforcement agencies responsibility.
1.While monitoring continuously any financial transactions to and from Somalia is critical and taking actions against terrorist financing is key to defeating terrorist organization, we should also refrain from a wholesale halting of the Diaspora remittance, which is today (in the absence of the national financial institutions) the lifeline of the country.
3. Financial Management:
1.Create an independent Joint Financial Management Board presided by a former Head of State to ensure and monitor mutual accountability between Somalia and donors.
1.Greater transparency and accountability on the financial management is required. Therefore, while developing and following the standard fiscal framework and improved budgetary process for the entire budget cycle is critical, it is likewise necessary to install internal financial control, accountability and reporting structures, as well as a parliamentary oversight of the budget process.
1.To that end, to show more accountability and transparency, the TFG should open its books for auditing to the International community and likewise, the UNOS, UNDP, WFP, etc., should also open their books for auditing to account how and where they have devolved and spent the money earmarked for Somalia. Bi-monthly financial reports should be published.
1.III. CONCLUSION:
The timing of the United Kingdom’s conference on the situation in Somalia is critical. Consequently, while the British government and the International Community seek this opportunity to coordinate and improve their policy toward Somalia and bring about a lasting solution, we urge them to base their decisions on TFG’s recent accomplishments.
Second, as we recognize the AU countries’ brotherly sacrifices in blood and financial resources and their utmost role in enhancing security, which has certainly prevented our nation sovereignty to succumb under the pressure of the terrorist forces, we also believe that the only lasting solution to the complex security problem of our country and by in large to counter the piracy and terrorism question, is to rebuild a credible Somali security sector capable of guaranteeing the country’s law and order and internal security, secure good neighborhood, and provide a long-term deterrence to the issue of piracy and terrorism.
Notwithstanding the current difficulties, Somalia is striving to maintain its inalienable right as a sovereign state and territorial integrity; as such any attempt that would limit or denigrate its self-government will unnecessarily generate another dangerous cycle of conflict.
SENIOR OFFICIALS TECHNICAL MEETING:
PROMOTING LOCAL STABILITY IN SOMALIA
11 January 2012
Abu Dhabi, UAE
CHAIR’S SUMMARY
In advance of the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February, the UK chaired a senior officials technical meeting on 11 January in Abu Dhabi to discuss how best to promote local stability across Somalia. The UK is very grateful to the United Arab Emirates for hosting the meeting, and for their continued support to the London Conference on Somalia.
The Abu Dhabi meeting is one of several meetings that the UK is convening with Somali and international stakeholders in advance of the London Conference, to consult on the proposed agenda and the key areas for discussion. The meeting was attended by representatives of the London Conference core group[1].
The participants recognised the importance of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and their successors for both local and national political reconciliation. It was also agreed that supporting existing and emerging local areas of stability in Somalia is a crucial part of building peace and security for the Somali people. The two tracks of supporting local (bottom-up) and national (top-down) stability should reinforce each other.
This agenda is important because:
(1) Greater local stability can have immediate benefits for ordinary Somali men and women;
(2) It is a key component of broadening support for the transition, reaching a national level political settlement and building a legitimate central authority in Mogadishu after August 2012;
(3) There is an opportunity at the moment to build on recent military gains, and the growing commitment within Somalia to reconciliation and outreach.
There was also recognition that this approach carries risks. It could jeopardise a sustainable national level political settlement. Providing resources without informed analysis could create perverse incentives and accelerate the emergence of illegitimate, irresponsible and/or competing local administrations.
There was agreement that the Garowe Principles[2] were a significant step in the right direction. They provide a useful guide to moving forward on various constitutional issues, including on local involvement in future national political arrangements, and they restate Somalis’ continuing commitment to federalism. Further consultation with wider Somali stakeholders will be needed on the Garowe Principles – notably on the nature of federalism – starting with the Garowe II meeting.
The discussion on current local interventions raised several important lessons learnt from existing work. Current programmes (such as the Joint Programme on Local Governance, and the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization programme) set out criteria for support to local areas (particularly communities and districts in more stable areas). These provide a useful framework for developing agreed principles for wider international engagement that could accommodate a range of entry levels (e.g. community, district, area-based).
On the basis of this discussion, it was agreed that it would be useful for the London Conference to endorse a set of principles of good practice on how the international community should support local stability in Somalia.
These principles could include the following:
1.Access: The security situation in any area must allow development partners sufficient access to assess support needed, to provide it, and to monitor and evaluate implementation.
2.Ownership: Local communities should determine interventions, and play a role in implementation.This process should be managed in a way which increases the incentives for stability, by responding to local needs.
3.Inclusion: Adequate attention should be paid to which local people are involved in decision-making, in particular to give under-represented groups a say, and to bind in those who may otherwise have an interest in restarting conflict.
4.Flexibility: Interventions should be based on in-depth understanding of local circumstances, and tailored according to context. Where a full package of support is not initially appropriate, an incremental approach to providing assistance should be used (rather than waiting for ideal circumstances).
5.Integration: Each region will require a differentiated approach that integrates political, security and development elements. Humanitarian aid should continue to be provided based solely on need, but issues around resettlement of refugees and IDPs also need to be factored in.
6.Transparency: Resources provided to local areas should be used and accounted for in a transparent manner. Costs of local stability work should be shared with local people through agreement on distribution of revenues.
7.Recognition of central authority: Local representatives should acknowledge the Transitional Federal Charter and related peace agreements, the role of the TFIs in Mogadishu, and the constitutional process.
8.Reconciliation: Local representatives should have a clear and demonstrable commitment to reconciliation between parties to the conflict in Somalia (including the TFIs).
9.Partnerships: Interventions should build and strengthen strategic partnerships between local institutions, civil society groups and the private sector, and between different Somali areas.
10.Sustainability: Support should be provided in a way which will allow the continuation of benefits over time, including when external assistance ends. Building the capacity of local people and institutions to engage with political processes, deliver services and address threats will be a critical part of this.11.Conflict sensitivity: When supporting new areas which have the potential for local legitimacy but lack widespread recognition in Somalia, the principle of “do no harm” should be a priority.These principles will be developed further to form the basis for further engagement with a wider group of Somali and international stakeholders. They should take account of previous work led by the UN on such principles.
It was agreed that Somalis themselves need to agree the principles of what local stability means in practice across the country, and manage the delivery of it. The new constitution should create the broader political vision within which this can be worked out. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its successor should prepare and maintain an overall strategic framework for supporting local stability.
There was acceptance that bringing local parties on board often takes time, but that this process is important in reducing the potential for conflict. However, when interventions begin they need to show clear and immediate benefits for local people. Further discussion is required on how to balance taking advantage of new opportunities to work in previously insecure areas as quickly as possible (e.g. through quick impact projects), with due caution in not rushing in too quickly in contravention of best practice.
It was agreed that dialogue could start with clan and other community leaders in areas where it is not yet possible for the international community to provide support due to insecurity, and that the international community should encourage the TFG and other Roadmap signatories to engage in such dialogue.
Participants discussed ways in which support to local stability could be financed and coordinated. There was agreement that current coordination arrangements were not adequate, and would become even less so if the amount of support increased. Better coordination was needed to improve coherence and efficiency in the provision of assistance. Participants also agreed that there was a need for better information sharing on existing and future work promoting local stability.
How coordination should be organised in future will need to be looked at in the context of wider work on revitalising international coordination on Somalia, which is one of the themes of the London Conference. Participants agreed that the TFG would need to be involved in coordinating this work, and that this should be through Roadmap structures in the short-term. This should also allow the contributions and interests of countries in the region to be taken into account.
Some participants expressed interest in a local stability fund, if it could be designed to respond in a fast and flexible way to emerging needs, and complement other delivery mechanisms. Others questioned whether an additional funding mechanism was really needed, and whether existing mechanisms could be adapted.It was agreed that further work was needed in the next two weeks on whether an announcement could be made on a local stability fund at the London Conference. The UK will circulate a more detailed proposal w/b 23 January.
The UK and other participants will consult further on these ideas during January and February with the TFIs, other relevant Somalis (including local representatives, and civil society organisations), and other countries and institutions attending the London Conference.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] African Union, Ethiopia, European Union, France, Italy, Kenya, Norway, Qatar, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Nations, United States of America
[2] Agreed on 24 December 2011 by the Roadmap signatories
January 10, 2012
UK Introduction:
UK reintroduced the objectives of this conference: to galvanize international engagement, to inject fervor, to take stock on current progress. UK affirmed several times that this was not a conference that was intended to disrupt Roadmap efforts or to establish a parallel process.
Non Paper on the Political Track:
All parties acknowledged that this paper was written before the Garowe Principles were signed by the Somali stakeholders and as a result, many of its suggestions were moot. TFG OPM said that the London Conference should support the Somali decisions in the Garowe Principles. TFG also emphasized that Somalia was finished with transitions and interim political arrangements, and August 2012 was going to be the start of permanent government.
While all international community representative supported the Garowe Principles and affirmed that they did not want to see any new constructs, they did call for the following things:
By February, they would need to see visible signs of progress such as steps towards completion of the constitution, mechanisms in place for selection of the NCA and the new parliament. (USA)
Operationalization of the Garowe Principles and greater concensus around it. For example, broader participation in the Garowe Principles, i.e., support from elders, civil society, youth, etc. (Sweden)
Clarity around how we were going to avoid having the current political issue of the two speakers taint or pollute the London Conference? (France)
Deputy SRSG outlined his hopes for the London Conference to be a stock-taking exercise and a discussion on the resources required. He outlined these five areas:
1.Security consolidation
2.Governance, in terms of accountability but also in terms of administrative capability in managing the newly recovered areas.
3.Implementation of the new constitution
4.Elections – not just at the end of the next 4 year period, but consistently during these four years at the district/regional level. This will allow Somalis to build up their know-how, develop census, etc. (Last Somali election was in 1960)
5.International community’s involvement – the future of AMISOM, engagement of the UN, the Trust Fund arrangement, etc.
TFG OPM affirmed the territorial integrity of Somalia and raised the question of Somaliland and the UK’s intentions on this topic at the London Conference. UK affirmed their support for the territorial integrity of Somalia, reassured the group that the UK has not recognized Somaliland’s independence, but they did think that Somaliland had a lot to contribute towards Somalia’s future. They did confirm that Somaliland has been invited to attend the conference.
TFG Office of the President also expressed concern about the discrepancy between the UK non-paper’s interim period and the Garowe Principles. Simultaneously, they presented a position paper that includes recommendations on Reconciliation (e.g., facilitating a Somali-led effort, bringing Somaliland to the table), Security (e.g., rebuilding Somali forces, lifting UN arms embargo) and Financial Management (e.g., creating an independent Joint Financial Management Board). A copy is attached.
Non-Paper on Supporting Military Efforts in Somalia:
TFG OPM asked the group to support the NSSP, into which both the TFG and the international community had already poured a great deal of effort and resource.
TFG Ambassador to Kenya affirmed that Somalia condemns the pirates and asked the international community to condemn illegal fishing in Somali waters. A small discussion on the topic of the EEZ commenced, with the TFG OPM reemphasizing that the Cabinet of Ministers and the Somali Parliament have removed this topic from the Roadmap. It was agreed to take this topic offline.
AU gave a small update on the recent AU Peace and Security Committee meeting, affirming that they are working on defining the new resources and force enablers needed.
USA called for more donors to engage in supporting AMISOM and the TFG Forces as the resources base was too narrow.
Non-Paper on Financial and Asset Management in Somalia:
The discussion centered around the need to come up with clear TOR for the Joint Management Financial Board prior to the February Conference, answering difficult questions such as the relationship between this body and the new Parliament (i.e., whether this body’s decisions would have to be ratified by Parliament?)
Non-Paper on Promoting Local Stability in Somalia:
In introducing this topic, the UK emphasized the importance of supporting local development and stability, while avoiding balkanization and fragmentation. They emphasized the importance of the principle of “do no harm” when injecting cash into local environments.
TFG OPM emphasized that given the political nature of these efforts, the TFG would be the ideal party to coordinate these efforts. The TFG has developed a principles guiding the TFG are:
(1) Promoting social reconciliation and setting up political administrations
(2) Restoring law and order and justice
(3) Containment of heavy weapons, followed by comprehensive DDR
(4) Restoring humanitarian relief distribution; and repatriation of IDPs and refugees
(5) Providing basic services
TFG OPM also emphasized the importance of international community efforts in local areas not undermining the credibility of the TFG.
Deputy SRSG suggested that one of the principles to guide international community engagement with local areas or unit should be that (1) there should be a commitment to the Roadmap process by such unit, and (2) the units should be civilian and not military administrations.
TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA’S POSITION PAPER ON THE LOND ON CONFERENCE: EMERGING THOUGHTS
I. BACKGROUND:
The United Kingdom government has recently announced a conference on the Situation in Somalia to be held on February 23, 2012 in London. Subsequently, certain statements were made by British officials to pave the way for the said conference. The British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, said: “Somalia poses significant threats to international security, as a base for terrorists and pirates who threaten the security and prosperity of people around the world.” Furthermore, British Prime Minister, David Cameron, issued a statement calling Somalia a “failed state that directly threatens British interests.”
It is imperative to underline three particular facts. First, threats that have been emanating from Somalia are currently in declining trend. Second, these threats are symptoms, not the core problems. Third, political instability and underdeveloped and mal-equipped security apparatus are the real problems.
The aforementioned statements stand in sharp contrast to the current situation in Somalia and do not seem to take into considerations recent development that occurred in the latter half of 2011. Despite the enormous and agonizing difficulties encountered mainly on the security front, Somalia has certainly been bouncing back from the dark security challenges of the past two decades, thanks to the extraordinary determination and perseverance of the Somali TFG and AMISOM forces.
Though sporadic armed clashes still occur, the TFG and AMISOM forces have defeated Al-shabaab and cleared them from the capital city. As a result, today the ordinary residents of Mogadishu are able to get around and resume their normal lives in safety and security once again. Moreover, recent visits by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in August 2011 and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in December 2011, demonstrate Mogadishu’s strides in security.
The Al-shabaab’s forces are now on the run and its reign of terror is precipitously withdrawing from many cities and districts under the coordinated joint military pressure. The process of eradicating Al-Shabaab is already underway, and the total liberation of the country from the clutches of Al-shabaab terrorism is soon to be a reality.
For the past year and half, the TFG faced the worst famine in Somalia in sixty years and with backing of the international community and our Turkish friends, we have made some progress in reaching those affected by the famine. This famine created new challenges and many TFG resources were diverted to tackling its consequences and ensuring effective delivery of aid.
Additionally, on the security front, Somalia has developed a comprehensive medium term National Security Stabilization Plan (NSSP) that outlines clearly benchmarks and responsibility for its implementation. The NSSP, which has been already passed by the TFG cabinet aims at stabilizing the country in the next three years 2011-2014.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LONDON CONFERENCE:
In our view, the recently announced February 23, 2012 UK government conference on the Situation in Somalia should build on recent TFG accomplishments and support a more lasting solution for Somalia. The agenda should not be limited to the issues of piracy and international security. Rather, it should include addressing the root causes of those security concerns. For the London Conference to be successful we are putting forth the following recommendations:
1- Reconciliation:
We believe that a military victory leading to a durable peace is unlikely. Therefore, we seek a comprehensive peace process that includes all stakeholders at all levels and has international guarantees.
1.Primary focus should be on facilitating a Somali-led national all inclusive reconciliation effort.
1.The British government should use its diplomatic and political weight in bringing Somaliland to the table; not as an observer, but as a partner in peace.
1.Strategize ways to address the range of driving factors fueling the conflict in Somalia and help prevent recurring conflict.
2- Security: Highlight the importance of national security mechanisms to enhance the legitimacy of the national government.
1.The only lasting solution to the complex security problem is to rebuild a credible Somali national army, police, and intelligence security force capable of guaranteeing Somalia’s internal security and territorial water.
1.Lift the current UN arms embargo resolution to allow the Somali armed force import the required weaponry, mobility and military supplies that would enable their combat readiness to totally disrupt and defeat Al-shabaab and carry out their defensive mandate.
1.Build a viable Somali navy and strengthen the Somali national coast guard with efficient operational capacity, training; armed and equipped with adequate weaponry, technology and supplies (i.e. adequate patrol boats, ships, radar and radios) that would allow them to protect our coastal and maritime security, including piracy, toxic waste dumping, illegal fishing, and armed robbery in the Somali coast.
1.Finalize the enlistment and training of the 30,000 troops; guarantee their continuous and incessant stipend payment and the refurbishing of troops’ barracks, headquarters and training facilities, so that the command and control of the army units is secured, troops are provided with adequate quarters; the routine trainings programs are regularly and frequently carried out. All this will come to the same cost as 12,000 AMISOM troops.
1.Re-institute and revitalize the law enforcement agencies and their facilities, including the police stations in all urban centers, the custodial corps and court system. This to guarantee the competent fulfillment of law enforcement agencies responsibility.
1.While monitoring continuously any financial transactions to and from Somalia is critical and taking actions against terrorist financing is key to defeating terrorist organization, we should also refrain from a wholesale halting of the Diaspora remittance, which is today (in the absence of the national financial institutions) the lifeline of the country.
3. Financial Management:
1.Create an independent Joint Financial Management Board presided by a former Head of State to ensure and monitor mutual accountability between Somalia and donors.
1.Greater transparency and accountability on the financial management is required. Therefore, while developing and following the standard fiscal framework and improved budgetary process for the entire budget cycle is critical, it is likewise necessary to install internal financial control, accountability and reporting structures, as well as a parliamentary oversight of the budget process.
1.To that end, to show more accountability and transparency, the TFG should open its books for auditing to the International community and likewise, the UNOS, UNDP, WFP, etc., should also open their books for auditing to account how and where they have devolved and spent the money earmarked for Somalia. Bi-monthly financial reports should be published.
1.III. CONCLUSION:
The timing of the United Kingdom’s conference on the situation in Somalia is critical. Consequently, while the British government and the International Community seek this opportunity to coordinate and improve their policy toward Somalia and bring about a lasting solution, we urge them to base their decisions on TFG’s recent accomplishments.
Second, as we recognize the AU countries’ brotherly sacrifices in blood and financial resources and their utmost role in enhancing security, which has certainly prevented our nation sovereignty to succumb under the pressure of the terrorist forces, we also believe that the only lasting solution to the complex security problem of our country and by in large to counter the piracy and terrorism question, is to rebuild a credible Somali security sector capable of guaranteeing the country’s law and order and internal security, secure good neighborhood, and provide a long-term deterrence to the issue of piracy and terrorism.
Notwithstanding the current difficulties, Somalia is striving to maintain its inalienable right as a sovereign state and territorial integrity; as such any attempt that would limit or denigrate its self-government will unnecessarily generate another dangerous cycle of conflict.
SENIOR OFFICIALS TECHNICAL MEETING:
PROMOTING LOCAL STABILITY IN SOMALIA
11 January 2012
Abu Dhabi, UAE
CHAIR’S SUMMARY
In advance of the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February, the UK chaired a senior officials technical meeting on 11 January in Abu Dhabi to discuss how best to promote local stability across Somalia. The UK is very grateful to the United Arab Emirates for hosting the meeting, and for their continued support to the London Conference on Somalia.
The Abu Dhabi meeting is one of several meetings that the UK is convening with Somali and international stakeholders in advance of the London Conference, to consult on the proposed agenda and the key areas for discussion. The meeting was attended by representatives of the London Conference core group[1].
The participants recognised the importance of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and their successors for both local and national political reconciliation. It was also agreed that supporting existing and emerging local areas of stability in Somalia is a crucial part of building peace and security for the Somali people. The two tracks of supporting local (bottom-up) and national (top-down) stability should reinforce each other.
This agenda is important because:
(1) Greater local stability can have immediate benefits for ordinary Somali men and women;
(2) It is a key component of broadening support for the transition, reaching a national level political settlement and building a legitimate central authority in Mogadishu after August 2012;
(3) There is an opportunity at the moment to build on recent military gains, and the growing commitment within Somalia to reconciliation and outreach.
There was also recognition that this approach carries risks. It could jeopardise a sustainable national level political settlement. Providing resources without informed analysis could create perverse incentives and accelerate the emergence of illegitimate, irresponsible and/or competing local administrations.
There was agreement that the Garowe Principles[2] were a significant step in the right direction. They provide a useful guide to moving forward on various constitutional issues, including on local involvement in future national political arrangements, and they restate Somalis’ continuing commitment to federalism. Further consultation with wider Somali stakeholders will be needed on the Garowe Principles – notably on the nature of federalism – starting with the Garowe II meeting.
The discussion on current local interventions raised several important lessons learnt from existing work. Current programmes (such as the Joint Programme on Local Governance, and the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization programme) set out criteria for support to local areas (particularly communities and districts in more stable areas). These provide a useful framework for developing agreed principles for wider international engagement that could accommodate a range of entry levels (e.g. community, district, area-based).
On the basis of this discussion, it was agreed that it would be useful for the London Conference to endorse a set of principles of good practice on how the international community should support local stability in Somalia.
These principles could include the following:
1.Access: The security situation in any area must allow development partners sufficient access to assess support needed, to provide it, and to monitor and evaluate implementation.
2.Ownership: Local communities should determine interventions, and play a role in implementation.This process should be managed in a way which increases the incentives for stability, by responding to local needs.
3.Inclusion: Adequate attention should be paid to which local people are involved in decision-making, in particular to give under-represented groups a say, and to bind in those who may otherwise have an interest in restarting conflict.
4.Flexibility: Interventions should be based on in-depth understanding of local circumstances, and tailored according to context. Where a full package of support is not initially appropriate, an incremental approach to providing assistance should be used (rather than waiting for ideal circumstances).
5.Integration: Each region will require a differentiated approach that integrates political, security and development elements. Humanitarian aid should continue to be provided based solely on need, but issues around resettlement of refugees and IDPs also need to be factored in.
6.Transparency: Resources provided to local areas should be used and accounted for in a transparent manner. Costs of local stability work should be shared with local people through agreement on distribution of revenues.
7.Recognition of central authority: Local representatives should acknowledge the Transitional Federal Charter and related peace agreements, the role of the TFIs in Mogadishu, and the constitutional process.
8.Reconciliation: Local representatives should have a clear and demonstrable commitment to reconciliation between parties to the conflict in Somalia (including the TFIs).
9.Partnerships: Interventions should build and strengthen strategic partnerships between local institutions, civil society groups and the private sector, and between different Somali areas.
10.Sustainability: Support should be provided in a way which will allow the continuation of benefits over time, including when external assistance ends. Building the capacity of local people and institutions to engage with political processes, deliver services and address threats will be a critical part of this.11.Conflict sensitivity: When supporting new areas which have the potential for local legitimacy but lack widespread recognition in Somalia, the principle of “do no harm” should be a priority.These principles will be developed further to form the basis for further engagement with a wider group of Somali and international stakeholders. They should take account of previous work led by the UN on such principles.
It was agreed that Somalis themselves need to agree the principles of what local stability means in practice across the country, and manage the delivery of it. The new constitution should create the broader political vision within which this can be worked out. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its successor should prepare and maintain an overall strategic framework for supporting local stability.
There was acceptance that bringing local parties on board often takes time, but that this process is important in reducing the potential for conflict. However, when interventions begin they need to show clear and immediate benefits for local people. Further discussion is required on how to balance taking advantage of new opportunities to work in previously insecure areas as quickly as possible (e.g. through quick impact projects), with due caution in not rushing in too quickly in contravention of best practice.
It was agreed that dialogue could start with clan and other community leaders in areas where it is not yet possible for the international community to provide support due to insecurity, and that the international community should encourage the TFG and other Roadmap signatories to engage in such dialogue.
Participants discussed ways in which support to local stability could be financed and coordinated. There was agreement that current coordination arrangements were not adequate, and would become even less so if the amount of support increased. Better coordination was needed to improve coherence and efficiency in the provision of assistance. Participants also agreed that there was a need for better information sharing on existing and future work promoting local stability.
How coordination should be organised in future will need to be looked at in the context of wider work on revitalising international coordination on Somalia, which is one of the themes of the London Conference. Participants agreed that the TFG would need to be involved in coordinating this work, and that this should be through Roadmap structures in the short-term. This should also allow the contributions and interests of countries in the region to be taken into account.
Some participants expressed interest in a local stability fund, if it could be designed to respond in a fast and flexible way to emerging needs, and complement other delivery mechanisms. Others questioned whether an additional funding mechanism was really needed, and whether existing mechanisms could be adapted.It was agreed that further work was needed in the next two weeks on whether an announcement could be made on a local stability fund at the London Conference. The UK will circulate a more detailed proposal w/b 23 January.
The UK and other participants will consult further on these ideas during January and February with the TFIs, other relevant Somalis (including local representatives, and civil society organisations), and other countries and institutions attending the London Conference.
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[1] African Union, Ethiopia, European Union, France, Italy, Kenya, Norway, Qatar, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Nations, United States of America
[2] Agreed on 24 December 2011 by the Roadmap signatories
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